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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Bioeconomy: Biotechnology and Law 
at the International Hellenic University. 
Biomedical laboratories are full of various biological risks. All these risks should be 
identified, assessed and controlled, in order to prevent accidents, laboratory infections 
and loss of lives, and improve the overall safety and quality. Controlling the biological 
risks in the laboratory requires the identification of these risks with a risk assessment, 
following by the implementation of the hierarchy of controls, which is a combination of 
engineering and administrative controls, good microbiological practices and procedures 
and the appropriate personal protective equipment. 
A Biorisk Management system must be put in place, in order to sufficiently develop and 
implement the risk policy, the procedures and the responsibilities in the laboratory, with 
the objective to eliminate or to minimize to an acceptable level the biological risks for 
the laboratory professionals, the community and the environment.  
Greek Biomedical laboratories still have to introduce a biorisk management approach 
and a Biosafety culture. This introduction will help to make the Biomedical laboratories 
in Greece a safer workplace and to improve the quality of diagnostic testing performed 
in these laboratories, because standard operating procedures contribute both in 
Biosafety and in Quality. That approach not only needs changes in the organizations 
themselves and at the national/regional level, but also at the regulatory level in Greece. 
 
 
Keywords: (Biorisk management, Biomedical laboratories, Biological risk, Biosafety, 
Biosecurity) 
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INTRODUCTION 
A Biomedical laboratory or a clinical laboratory is a facility in a hospital or a health 
center in which diagnostic tests are performed on patient samples, to obtain 
information on the patient's health and to help diagnose, treat and prevent a disease 
(Farr and Shatkin, 2004). 
Laboratories play a crucial and key role in the identification, diagnosis, treatment and 
management of illnesses in all health care systems (Brown et al., 2015). In almost all 
aspects of health services, laboratory results are crucial for health decision-making, 
since roughly 60-70% of medical decisions based on laboratory diagnostic test results 
(Kessel, 2014). 
Biomedical laboratories are an example where science is applied for the direct benefit 
of the patient, unlike to those laboratories such as found in academic or research 
institutions and the pharmaceutical industry that are focus on basic science. 
In hospitals and other healthcare settings, the layouts of Biomedical laboratories vary 
greatly from one facility to another and are generally divided into the following sections: 
Anatomic Pathology, Clinical Microbiology, Clinical Chemistry, Hematology, Blood Bank 
and Molecular Diagnostics. 
Biomedical laboratories are full of biological risks due to the nature of the diagnostic 
samples and the uncertainty of any microbiological agent that could be present in these 
samples. During the commissioning of such a laboratory, all potential risks of the 
handled materials and procedures need to be identified, evaluated and controlled. 
Besides the risk assessments, it is preferable that a risk management system is also 
implemented to avoid incidents, accidents or fatalities and to continuously develop the 
total safety and efficiency at the laboratory. Controlling the biological risks in the 
laboratory is a combination of engineering and administrative controls, good 
microbiological practices and procedures and personal protection, such as personal 
protective equipment (PPE) and vaccination, that should all be part of a risk 
management system. Another important aspect of laboratory safety is the safety 
culture, which must be adopted, supported and developed by the top management, to 
eliminate or to minimize the biological hazards to an acceptable level for the laboratory 
professionals, the community and the environment (Tun, 2017). 
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One aspect of laboratory safety is the Biosafety, which often represented with the 
symbol of Biohazard (Figure 1). According to WHO, Biosafety is the term to describe the 
unintentional exposure to pathogens, thus: “the containment principles, technologies 
and practices that are implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens and 
toxins, or their accidental release” (World Health Organization, 2004). 
Biological safety management includes defining significant hazards of the biological 
materials handled in the laboratory and ensuring that adequate precautions are taken, 
to avoid and to prevent laboratory acquired infections (University of Birmingham, 2014). 
Biosafety is a Multi-sectoral area requiring the involvement and cooperation of all 
interested authorities, professionals and stakeholders and is not only a list of guidelines, 
but mostly what we do with these guidelines and how to implement them. 
 
Figure 1: Symbol of Biohazard. (Adapted from World Health Organization, 2004) 
Besides laboratory Biosafety some laboratories also need laboratory Biosecurity, 
based on the agents processed in the lab. Biosecurity is the term to describe 
“institutional and personal security measures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, 
diversion or intentional release of pathogens and toxins” (World Health Organization, 
2004). 
These two concepts (Biosafety and Biosecurity) complement each other, but there is 
no Biosecurity without a proper Biosafety regime. Biosecurity is only of importance for 
laboratories handling high-risk materials and highly dangerous pathogens. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Risk agents and Risk groups 
Biological agents are Bacteria, Viruses, Parasites, Prions, etc. Although many of these 
agents are found in nature and they are harmless for humans, some may cause hazards 
(Occupational Safety and Health Administration, n.d.). The World Health Organization 
(WHO) divided the biological agents into four risk groups, according to their main 
biological characteristics and the way that the potential disease could be transmitted 
(World Health Organization, 2004; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009). A 
comparable classification was defined in the NIH Guidelines and 4 hazardous risk groups 
were designated as human etiology agents (National Institutes of Health, 2016). WHO 
and NIH classifications are included in Table 1.  
 Table 1: Risk groups (Modified from World Health Organization, 2004) 
RG 
Individual 
Risk 
Community 
Risk 
Description 
Treatment 
Prevention 
1 
No / Very 
low 
No / Very low 
Unlikely to cause human 
or animal disease 
─ 
2 Moderate Low Can cause disease 
Often 
Available 
3 High Low 
Usually causes serious 
human disease 
May be 
Available 
4 High High 
Usually causes serious 
human disease 
Not usually 
Available 
 
Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) 
Laboratory staff handling biological materials in Biomedical laboratories (Table 2) is 
exposed to biological risk factors, both through direct contact with biological samples 
that are potentially containing biological agents, or the biological agents isolated from 
these samples. Incidents when handling these biological samples can lead to LAIs, 
through one of these transmission routes: aerosol transmission, ingestion, blood-blood 
contact and contact with the biological agents.  
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Table 2: LAIs (Modified from Pike, 1976) 
Laboratory category Number Percentage 
Research 2307 58.8 
Biomedical Laboratories 677 17.3 
Production 134 3.4 
Teaching 106 2.7 
Unspecified 697 17.8 
 
LAIs include infections acquired in the laboratory or lab-related activities and they could be 
either symptomatic or asymptomatic (Figure 2). Because causes are not always known how the 
infection took place, there are many challenges regarding the prevention of exposure to 
pathogens and the prevention of infections acquired in the laboratory. Reasons for this are lack 
of precise data on the actual risk of infection after exposure, lack of uniform and coherent 
surveillance systems for LAIs, under-reporting of LAIs, incomplete/heterogeneous reporting on 
incidents and accidents, the type of information required in post-exposure reporting and 
insufficient evidence and based studies on safe practices in Biomedical Laboratories (Sewell, 
1995). 
 
 
Figure 2: Noticed LAIs (Adapted from Pfeiffer, 2002) 
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Figure 3: Bio-incidents (Adapted from Willemarck et al., 2012) 
Incidents with biological samples that can result in LAIs are diverse. In a recent inquiry 
in Flanders Belgium, the most frequent laboratory incidents are spills and needle stick 
incidents (Figure 3). Other frequent incidents are splashes and failing recipients. 
Technical failures of equipment or containment measure are less frequent, but still 
occur. It is believed that the incidents that happen in other laboratories in Europe will 
not differ greatly from those in Belgium and thus will also occur in Biomedical 
laboratories in Greece and are the main causes of LAIs. Also, in the past, these incidents 
were considered the main causes of LAIs (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: Types and accidents associated with LAIs (Adapted from Sewell, 1995) 
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The main cause of LAIs are infections spread by aerosols. Most of the incidents from 
the Flanders inquiry and those of Pike can create aerosols and are therefore a great risk 
for the health of the laboratory staff. To decrease the number of incidents or the effects 
of the incidents for laboratory staff appropriate Biosafety measures should be in place 
in Biomedical laboratories. 
Despite the increasing use of containment measures supported by safe Laboratory 
Practices and the increase in the level of training of staff, accidental exposures, incidents 
and accidents still occur in laboratories (Table 3). This suggests that the procedures of 
Biosafety and Biosecurity are not always effectively implemented or followed, probably 
due to a lack of awareness by the management and the laboratory staff. 
Table 3: Top Ten LAIs (Modified from Fleming and Hunt, 2006) 
Top 10 LAIs 1979-2004 
Organism Cases 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis 199 
Arboviruses 192 
Coxiella burnetii 177 
Hantavirus 155 
Brucella 143 
Hepatitis B 82 
Shigella spp. 66 
Salmonella spp. 64 
Hepatitis C 32 
Neisseria meningitidis  31 
1.141 Laboratory-associated infections 
Yellow indicates organism can be transmitted by aerosol formation 
 
Additionally, this indicates that activities carried out in the Biomedical laboratory 
require the development of a proper biological risk management and mitigation 
measures, in order to avoid laboratory acquired infections and diseases and to protect 
the laboratory staff and thereby the community from biological agents and possible 
harmful patient samples.  
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CHAPTER 2: Hierarchy of Controls 
 
Figure 5: Hierarchy Controls (Adapted from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015)  
An approach for managing biological risks and preventing LAIs is the hierarchy of 
controls (Figure 5). The conventional hierarchy of controls indicates that when facing 
hazards in the laboratory there is a correct order to minimize the risk and ensure that 
laboratory staff is safe and secure. This approach has the following 5 steps to manage 
risks in the laboratory (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015): 
Elimination 
Elimination means not doing the intended examination or deciding not to work with a 
specific biological agent. Elimination clearly provides the highest level of risk reduction. 
However, this approach is not feasible working in Biomedical labs, where patients and 
medical doctors rely on the results of the tests for the diagnosis and treatment. 
Substitution 
Replace the source with a different, less harmful organism. However, in many 
situations, the elimination of risk is not always possible. For those cases, it may be 
necessary to use a substitute, or to replace or exchange the source of the identified risk 
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with another source that poses less hazard than the original risk. However, also this 
approach is not an option in the Biomedical laboratories.  
Engineering Controls or physical containment 
All engineering controls in the hierarchy of controls focus on containment of the 
materials used in the lab. Containment is a combination of physical changes to 
workstations, equipment, the laboratory itself, or any other relevant aspect of the work 
environment that reduces or prevents exposure to hazards.  
In Biomedical labs, modern analyzers are most of the time self-contained and provide 
enhanced safety for the laboratory staff, especially with the new automated systems 
with intergraded pre-analytical structures; therefore they are considering as closed 
systems. 
The objective of the containment is to minimize or to eliminate hazards from 
potentially harmful biological agents in the laboratory staff and the environment. 
Examples of containment of the laboratory itself can vary from the simple method of 
locking laboratory doors, to large HVAC (Heating, ventilation and air conditioning) 
systems controlling the directional airflow in a laboratory and filtering the outgoing air 
via HEPA (High-efficiency particulate air) filters, thereby protecting the environment 
outside the laboratory itself.  
Biological containment could be categorized in 2 levels, Primary and Secondary:  
Primary containment provides direct protection to laboratory staff in the Biomedical 
laboratory and the local laboratory environment itself from biological hazards and 
exposure to infectious agents. Examples of primary containment include safety 
equipment such as Biological Safety Cabinets (BSC), sealed containers, safety centrifuge 
cups and other safety devices, designed to eliminate or reduce exposure to dangerous 
biological materials (Chesapeake Area Biological Safety Association, n.d.). 
The BSC is the main equipment used to achieve isolation from infectious droplets or 
aerosols formed by a variety of microbiological processes. There are 3 types of Biosafety 
cabinets. Class I and II cabinets are designed to direct potentially contaminated air away 
from laboratory staff and through HEPA filters before exiting to the environment, and 
Class III cabinets are equipped with additional containment and using gas-tight glove 
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boxes. An idea of another primary obstacle is the security centrifuge cup, a sealed 
container aimed to prevent the release of aerosols during centrifugation. In order to 
reduce aerosol risks, containment systems such as BSCs or centrifugal cups must be used 
while managing infectious agents (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009). 
Secondary containment contains elements of architectural and mechanical design that 
prevent laboratory staff from contamination and from the escape of infectious materials 
outside the laboratory, to the environment. Examples of secondary barriers include: 
Separation of the main laboratory space from the public access, Autoclave facilities, 
Handwashing and eyewash stations and equipment, advanced Ventilation systems, 
Directional airflow and limited access areas (Chesapeake Area Biological Safety 
Association, n.d.).  
For instance, secondary barriers for most laboratory work with BSL-2 procedures could 
include the isolation of the laboratory work area from uncontrolled access, the provision 
of a decontamination facility (e.g. autoclave) and hand-washing equipment (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2009). 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines, which have been 
incorporated into European and Greek legislation, laboratories are classified as 
Biosafety levels (BSLs) with the aim the effective protection of the laboratory staff. The 
recommended classification of the Biosafety levels is mentioned with the numeric grade 
1 to 4, which are based on the design and construction characteristics of the laboratory, 
the practices, the operating procedures, the equipment and the isolation capabilities 
required for safe work with the different risk groups of biological agents in the 
laboratory (Table 4). 
Each level of Biosafety determines the working conditions that ensure laboratory staff 
is protected from biological factors. The 4 levels of laboratory Biosafety are associated 
with the 4 risk groups of biological agents, but they are not always identical. Non-
airborne biological agents, such as viruses (HBV, HCV, HIV), which belong to the risk 
group 3 and could be handled at the level of Biosafety 2 (BSL-2), are a good example. 
The characteristics of each Biosafety level are determined by European and Greek 
legislation, as well as by the guidelines of international organizations. All Clinical 
Diagnostic Laboratories must be constructed and function at least for Biosafety Level 2 
(BSL-2). However, as no laboratory could have full control over the biological samples it 
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obtains, the laboratory staff may be exposed to higher risks and therefore a risk 
assessment should always be performed (World Health Organization, 2004). 
Table 4: Biosafety Levels (Modified from World Health Organization, 2004) 
Biosafety 
Level 
Laboratory Type Practices Safety equipment 
Level 1 
Basic teaching 
Research 
 GMPP* Open bench work 
Level 2 
Biomedical 
Laboratories 
GMPP*                         
PPE 
Biohazard sign 
Open bench               
BSC for potential 
aerosols 
Level 3 
Special diagnostic, 
Research 
As Level 2          
GMPP*                     
Special PPE             
Controlled access  
BSC and other 
primary devices for 
all activities 
Level 4 
Dangerous 
pathogens unit 
As Level 3 
GMPP* 
Airlock entry               
Shower at exit           
Special waste 
disposal 
BSC (class III)      
Positive pressure 
suit + BSC II                              
Double door 
Autoclave        
Filtered air 
*GMPP - Good microbiological practices and procedures 
Although the commissioning process gives the laboratory and the surrounding 
community increased confidence and more trust that structural, electrical, mechanical 
and decontamination systems will operate as planned to ensure the containment of any 
possible harmful biological agent working with (Bathula and Rakhimol, 2017), this is not 
always the case, because it also depends in the working practices and the safety culture 
of the laboratory staff. 
Administrative Controls 
Administrative measures are a collection of measures such as controlled and limited 
entry, SOPs, training of the laboratory staff, but also policies, standards and guidelines 
to control risks. 
More specific, these measures are: 
• Standard Microbiological Practices or Good microbiological practices and 
procedures (GMPP), which are a code of practice, or a collection of standard 
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operating procedures, that are relevant to all types of laboratory activities with 
biological agents. This includes general behaviour, best practices and scientific 
procedures, which should always be followed and conducted in a consistent 
manner in the laboratory. The implementation of the common GMPP could 
provide protection to the laboratory staff and the community from infections and 
also avoids environmental contamination. GMPP are perhaps the most effective 
control measures, because human errors, improper laboratory routine 
examinations and use of laboratory equipment have been found to create the 
most laboratory damages and laboratory-related infections (World Health 
Organization, 2019). 
• Documenting written Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). By standardizing the 
way with which the biological materials are handled, fewer mistakes will be made, 
and exposure will be minimized. SOPs can also be used to minimize splashes, 
sprays, and the formation of aerosols, thus minimizing exposure and the risk for 
laboratory-acquired infections. These SOPs can also help to increase the quality of 
diagnostic examinations and thereby help to acquire a better level of Quality 
Assurance (QA) at the diagnostic testing. 
• Displaying biohazard or warning signages, markings and labeling, thus controlling 
patient, visitor and laboratory staff access. 
• Simple measures like hand washing before leaving the laboratory can be part of 
an SOP and reduces greatly the transfer of biological materials from the laboratory 
staff outside the lab, but also protects the environment and the community. 
It should be clear that SOPs are only part of the solution. With the introduction of 
SOPs, laboratory staff must be trained properly on how to use every SOP and the safety 
measures described in the SOPs. If training is not supplied SOPs have no additional 
benefit. 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
PPE is equipment worn by laboratory staff to protect them against exposure to 
biological materials and the microorganisms present in these materials. In general, the 
Personal Protective Equipment includes Gloves, Laboratory Coats (resistant to liquids, 
12 
 
disposable or re-usable), Face protection shields, Face masks, Safety glasses, Goggles, 
Hoods, Shoe covers, Gowns, Respiratory protection (N95 respirator)  and other specific 
PPE. All these material and safety elements must be provided to the laboratory staff and 
must be under the legal scope of the managerial aspects of each laboratory (Bathula and 
Rakhimol, 2017). 
PPE is considered the least effective control measure and the last line of defense, 
because it only protects the person who is wearing it, and only if it is used correctly. For 
example, a failure (rip in the material or a manufacturing defect) or inappropriate use, 
would likely result in exposure. Personal protective equipment is also used in 
combination with BSCs and other protection devices (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2009). 
However, using PPE should be combined with proper training, especially how to don 
and doff, otherwise the PPE can be used wrongly, making their effectivity smaller than 
expected. 
Also, vaccination or periodically medical checks are covered by personal protection. In 
some instances, vaccination is already a prerequisite for working with specific biological 
materials, for example when working with blood borne viruses, then it is an indication 
for Hepatitis B vaccination. 
“It is essential to control risks usually by elimination or reduction at the source” (Tun, 
2017), although in Biomedical laboratories these control measures are no option, as 
explained above. Using the last 3 steps of the hierarchy of controls, there could be an 
efficiently blocking of the transmission routes of the biological agents in the Biomedical 
laboratories ie. aerosol transmission, ingestion, blood-blood contact and contact with 
biological agents, thereby creating a safe working environment for the laboratory staff. 
Where danger cannot be managed entirely by the engineering controls, administrative 
controls or personal protective equipment must be used to protect the laboratory staff. 
It is worth noting that comprehensive risk assessments must be performed for every 
situation and/or facility separately. Each laboratory facility has different characteristics, 
personnel and equipment, and each organization has a different viewpoint on risk 
mitigation or acceptability. The techniques used in the laboratory and the experience, 
skills and abilities of the laboratory professionals conducting them are often not the very 
same. 
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CHAPTER 3: Laboratory Biorisk Management (LBM) 
What is Laboratory Biorisk Management 
Risk is the probability that an unfortunate event in connection with a particular hazard 
or danger will take place and the implications of that incidence (Sandia National 
Laboratories, 2014). Risk is simply a function of likelihood and consequences. Hazard is 
anything that has the potential to harm (World Health Organization, 2010). In addition 
to be at risk, there must be a scenario in which the danger may cause harm. For instance, 
a sharp needle is a hazard, but if the needle is in an empty laboratory and no one uses 
it, there will be no risk that someone could be injured by the needle. 
Risk management includes a broad spectrum of definitions, which should be 
mentioned for better clarification of the purposes of Biorisk management and the 
purpose of this thesis. Risk management is a continuous process for the detection, 
review, evaluation and monitoring of risk control, and financial resources to minimize 
various effects of losses (Marquette University, n.d.). Risk management systems are 
common across many industries, especially those industries in which accidents can 
cause serious consequences (Salerno and Gaudioso, 2015).  
The Biorisk management system (Figure 6) is part of the management system of an 
organization, used to create, enforce and maintain its risk strategy and manage its 
biorisks. It encompasses organizational structure, risk assessment activities, 
responsibilities, practices, procedures and resources (European Committee for 
Standardization, 2011). Biorisk management is a system for the monitoring of safety and 
security threats, in connection with biological agents handling, storage and disposal in 
the laboratories (World Health Organization, 2014). 
Over the past 30 years Biosafety procedures and later on also Biosecurity procedures 
are focused on the risks of biological agents based on their risk group classification. With 
this approach, differences in specific factors of pathogens such as the geographical 
distribution of the pathogen, increasing or decreasing the risk for the environment 
and/or the laboratory staff, were normally not taking into account when formulating 
mitigation measures. Not only in Biosafety practices in the laboratories, but also not in 
legislation, such as the workers' protection legislation. Other risk factors, such as the 
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performed work, the geographical location of the laboratory etc. where also considered 
not significant compared to the risk group (Salerno and Gaudioso, 2015). 
 
Figure 6: Biological risk assessment and management (Adapted from Willemarck, 2012) 
The outcome of this approach suggests that safety and security in laboratories 
dependents on the resources one can spend on this. Another issue with this approach is 
that Biosafety and Biosecurity become 2 separate subjects, although they are 
dependent and should be linked in laboratory environments (Salerno and Gaudioso, 
2015). 
By using a biorisk management system all subjects involved in Biosafety and 
Biosecurity are connected to each other on several levels within an organization. It 
focusses on the roles and responsibilities of the various layers an organization has. These 
roles and responsibilities are different for the top management and the laboratory staff 
and all the layers in the hierarchy of an organization. Furthermore, a biorisk 
management system takes all variables into account when performing a risk assessment 
and not only the risk group of the biological agent. A management system also ensures 
that risk assessment is constantly evaluated and adapted when needed, but also the 
performance of the measures that are in place is been assessed. The advantage of the 
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biorisk management system approach is that it can be used regardless of the size of an 
organization and it isn’t dependent only on the available resources. This makes a biorisk 
management system effective in every part of the world regardless of the geographical 
location of the organization where it is implemented (Salerno and Gaudioso, 2015). 
Apparently, the technological development of the biosciences leads to reconsider the 
conventional methods of preserving Biosafety and Biosecurity. The influence of 
biotechnology to deal with the threat posed by emerging infectious diseases to the 
public and economic health and the global accessibility of these technological advances 
has also led to the rapid expansion of technologically advanced laboratories around the 
world. The probability of a potentially disastrous Biosafety or Biosecurity incident 
significantly increases almost daily, notably if the traditional, rule-based Biosafety 
approach remains intact. Today, the bioscience society needs to establish and embrace 
a new holistic performance- and risk-based approach to manage the precautions of 
bioscience, before it is liable for a major disaster (Salerno and Gaudioso, 2015). 
Managing risks and risk assessment is a continuous process and needs a commitment 
of the top management. To manage biological risks the first step is a well-balanced risk 
assessment. 
Risk assessment 
As already mentioned above, the risk assessment is the fundamental process of the 
risk management system and involves steps for the selection of appropriate biological 
safety and security measures and other facility safeguards, to mitigate risks to an 
acceptable or manageable level (Sandia National Laboratories, 2014). 
Many organizations in the international community acknowledge the importance of 
risk assessment for the reduction of biological laboratory risks, such as the European 
Committee for Standardization (CEN), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the US 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
At the Biomedical Laboratories Risk Management, hygienic and safety conditions are 
of prime importance, as any risks can arise through the procedures and the tasks 
performed daily. The common goal is the risk assessment process to be accurate, 
efficient and reliable (Reid, 1999). 
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Risk assessments should be performed by a competent team and identified as credible 
by the various stakeholders. Confidence that hazards and risks have been evaluated 
methodologically, and that evaluations are accurate, can reduce conflict and confusion 
from the results of the risk assessments. 
There are numerous methods on how to perform a risk assessment. One of these 
methods is the 5-step method described in the 4th version of the Biosafety manual of 
WHO, still in a draft version (World Health Organization, 2019). This method described 
the following steps (Figure 7) for performing a risk assessment: 
 
Figure 7: The risk assessment framework (Adapted from World Health Organization, 2019) 
Step 1: “Gather information”  
The information is needed to identify the hazard (the materials working with, 
information from the requesting clinician and from previous tests available) and 
consider the nature of the work (World Health Organization, 2019).  
Questions to be asked in this step are for instance: 
• Where is the work carried out? 
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• Which handlings are performed with the biological materials? 
• Which kind of laboratory equipment is used? 
• Is there a single test or large volume of examinations? 
• Is there any aerosol generation? 
• Is there a use of sharps? 
Step 2: “Evaluate the risks”  
After the collection of all the available information in step 1, we should use them to 
find out and evaluate any biorisks that exist and calculate the overall risk as shown in 
Table 5. Risk = Likelihood x Consequence, a  combination of the probability of an incident 
and the severity of the damage (Perseus, n.d.). 
 Table 5: Risk matrix (Modified from World Health Organization, 2019) 
Consequences  
Severe Moderate High Very high 
Minor to 
Major 
Low Moderate High 
Negligible Very low Low Moderate 
    Unlikely  Possibly  Likely 
    Likelihood 
Step 3: “Develop a risk strategy”  
Upon determining the risk level, a risk management system needs to be developed to 
mitigate the biorisks to an acceptable level and to ensure the work in the laboratory 
could be done more safely. 
Step 4: “Select and implement control measures” 
Once the risk strategy has been established, risk control measures must be chosen and 
implemented, achieving the strategy and controlling the biorisks. In this step, the risks 
are evaluated and the proper control measures are defined on basis of the hierarchy of 
controls system, thus the Engineering and administrative Controls, the Personal 
Protective Equipment, the Vaccination and the medical monitoring of the laboratory 
staff (World Health Organization, 2019). 
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Step  5: “Review risks and control measures” 
When the risk assessments will be completed, they should be part of a risk 
management system, in order to make sure that new biological agents’ information, 
modifications of the laboratory activities or equipment and new controls that may be 
needed are routinely examined and revisioned, if necessary (World Health Organization, 
2019). 
It is worth mentioning that every change in an examination, process, SOP, material or 
technological procedure may lead and should lead to a change in the prevalence of the 
risk. Before initiating any new work, the laboratory should always conduct and report a 
risk assessment. A risk assessment should also be performed whenever there is a 
fundamental change in the laboratory, or a change in the rudimentary nature of the 
work being carried out. It is also important to initiate a periodic assessment of the 
laboratory risk, even under stable conditions. Biological risks may still alter even if the 
procedure or processes do not; thus, a risk assessment should be carried out and 
updated at least annually. Other examples of actions or incidents that alter the risk 
environment and require a new evaluation typically involve: New biological agents, 
toxins and reagents, New species of experimental animals, New methods and 
procedures, New equipment, Improvements in the manufacture or distribution of 
perishable protection equipment (PPE, containers, waste disposal products, etc.) 
(Sandia National Laboratories, 2014). 
For an effective working LBM system, two different approaches of review and 
improvements can be used. One is the PDCA cycle and the other one is the AMP system. 
Both systems will give continuous monitoring and improvement of the LBM, but also 
have essential differences in their approach. 
PDCA Cycle 
The PDCA cycle also called the “Deming cycle or Shewhart cycle” (Strotmann et al., 
2017), is a lean manufacturing technique developed in 1930 and at the beginning it was 
used as a tool for quality assurance of the products (Silva et al., 2017). Today is known 
as a continuous improvement method and is also known as a logic system that can 
improve operations (Sangpikul, 2017). 
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In the 1950s, W. Edwards Deming proposed that a simple continuous feedback loop 
would handle the necessary processes to alter or solve a problem in an organization. 
This process was illustrated and put into a cyclic and iterative four-step diagram as seen 
in Figure 8, called the plan-do-check-act (PDCA) model and it is now commonly known 
as the Deming cycle or the Deming wheel (Deming, 1950). 
 
Figure 8: Deming (PDCA) cycle  (adapted from Vasić et al, 2015).  
 
Biorisk management systems generally depend upon the PDCA cycle. Even CWA 
15793:2011 is built around the PDCA model. Successful implementation of PDCA can 
lead to measurable improvements in an organization’s efficiency, effectiveness and 
accountability, among other indicators of quality. 
When management notices that operations are not running smoothly and laboratory 
errors are happening too frequently, it is useful to have a process in place to find a 
solution, with the following steps of the PDCA cycle (Realyvásquez-Vargas et al, 2018): 
➢ “Plan: Planning, including identification of hazard and risk and establishing goals”  
In this step, a systematic analysis should identify the present status of the process to be 
studied, evaluate the causes of the problem and propose solutions (European 
Committee for Standardization, 2011). 
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➢ “Do: Implementing, including training and operational issues” 
The goal of this step is to execute the action plan, collect and record the details, and 
consider unexpected events, lessons learned and knowledge gained (European 
Committee for Standardization, 2011). 
➢ “Check: Checking, including monitoring and corrective action” 
In this step, the outcomes of the actions taken in the previous step are evaluated and 
what has been learned is established. A comparison is made before and after, 
performance is measured and improvements are verified, if the objectives have been 
achieved (European Committee for Standardization, 2011). 
➢ “Act: Reviewing, make needed changes to the management system” 
This step includes designing methods to standardize the changes, if the goals were met. 
Furthermore, new data and a progress check are collected only when insufficient data 
are available, or the conditions have been changed. If the implemented steps have not 
achieved significant improvements, then the project is stopped and the cycle restarts 
from the first step (European Committee for Standardization, 2011). 
The PDCA cycle is a structured way to ensure continuous improvements in the 
Laboratory Biorisk Management system. When management recognizes CHECK that 
operations are not running smoothly and laboratory errors are happening too 
frequently, they can make improvements in the Laboratory Biorisk Management system 
by ACTING on the findings in the CHECK phase. In this way, the LBM will be always up to 
date with the latest improvements, based on the findings in the CHECK phase, but also 
by implementing state-of-the-art laboratory techniques. Also, the quality of the 
laboratory test will benefit from this PDCA cycle of the LBM.  
The AMP Model 
Besides the PDCA approach, the World Health Organization uses another management 
system in its Biorisk Management Advanced Trainer Programme, the AMP model. The 
AMP model is widely used within the industry. 
The AMP model is based on 3 main components: Assessment (A), Mitigation (M) and 
Performance (P) (see Figure 9 for a schematic representation of the AMP model). The 
three components do not act separately but closely interact and are dependent on each 
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other to form the management system. When one of the components is ignored or not 
resolved the biorisk management system will fail, like a three-legged stool (Gribble, Tria 
and Wallis, 2015) 
 
Figure 9: The AMP model (adapted from Gribble, Tria and Wallis, 2015) 
In Assessment the first essential aspect of the biorisk management system starts with 
a risk assessment in the laboratory. As mentioned earlier, risk is the “combination of the 
likelihood of an incident and the severity of the harm” (World Health Organization, 
(2019). During the risk assessment, risks are identified and mitigation measures are 
formulated to reduce and handle laboratory risks caused by working with biological 
materials. The mitigation measures can vary from good microbiological practices and 
procedures and the use of a variety of adequate safety equipment and may differ 
depending on the biological agent. Also, security risk and other not biosafety related 
risks will be identified and measures to mitigate these will be provided (Gribble, Tria and 
Wallis, 2015). 
In the Mitigation step of the AMP model,  the mitigation measures identified during 
the risk assessment will be implemented within the working environment and will 
reduce or eliminate the risk, for the areas identified in the risk assessment, such as the 
laboratory staff and the environment. Mitigation measures that can be used are 
numerous and differ greatly, but all play a crucial role in reducing the risk to an 
acceptable level.  Mitigation measures alone, using the hierarchy of control approach, 
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are not sufficient for an effective biorisk management system, in which continuous 
improvements are crucial and this needs all the other components of the AMP model 
(Gribble, Tria and Wallis, 2015). 
Performance is the third pillar of the AMP biorisk management model. In this process, 
the mitigation measures are evaluated by their performance, if they successfully 
implemented and if they are still functioning adequately in reducing or eliminating the 
risks. Measures that are no longer efficient or became obsolete can be adapted, 
replaced or abolished. This helps to make the biorisk management system current and 
up to date, which is needed to create a safe working environment and helps the 
organization to achieve its operational goals, such as a high level of quality assurance.  
(Gribble, Tria and Wallis, 2015).  
The connection between Biorisk Management and Quality Assurance (QA) 
Most important for management systems is the control and continuous improvement 
of processes and thus also for the quality of processes and products. A fully developed 
biorisk management system, or any other management system, will be severely 
compromised, if a quality evaluation is not or is only partially carried out. Risk 
management and quality improvement are not systems that are isolated. They are both 
concentrated on the detection of potential problems and the implementation of 
corrective measures. Integrating both programmes can enhance the ability of a 
laboratory to minimize mistakes and improve the efficiency of its services. All laboratory 
staff needs to work as a team in order to have an integrated organizational risk 
management and quality improvement program. Regardless of how talented the 
employees could be, the organization's level of performance is not reached if they 
cannot function efficiently (Australian Council on Healthcare Standards, 2013). 
The ISO 9001:2015 and the ISO 15189:2012 are two examples of this: 
ISO 9001:2015 is designed to certify all kinds of organizations and because of that 
purpose, a generic approach is applied. The core approach is also the PDCA cycle, 
providing a logical and scientific model of management for a continuous quality 
improvement. The PDCA could help a laboratory to increase the standard of 
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performance, e.g. the analytical test results and to guarantee that the patients, but also 
the State and certification authorities will continue to be satisfied (WESTGARD QC, n.d.). 
➢ In the ISO 15189:2012 standard, in position 4.12, a similar list of actions is 
described in the WHO Laboratory quality management system, in order to achieve 
a continual improvement in the laboratory (World Health Organization, 2011). 
These are listed below: 
• “identify potential sources of any system weakness or error; 
• develop plans to implement improvement; 
• implement the plan; 
• review the effectiveness of the action through the process of focused review 
and audit; 
• adjust the action plan and modify the system in accordance with the review 
and audit results.” (World Health Organization, 2011) 
The quality of laboratory services has an impact not only on the quality of the health 
care of the individual patients, but it is also essential for the National Health System and 
the security, thus with the sustainable allocation of resources and the capacity to meet 
commitments, like the International Health Regulations (World Health Organization, 
2005). A comprehensive system of quality management ensures that laboratories could 
meet their quality requirements and also the Biosafety and Biosecurity regulations and 
guidelines (World Health Organization, 2016). 
Laboratory Biorisk Management standards 
In recent years, the concepts and practices of quality assurance programmes, such as 
the application of International Standard ISO 15189: 2012 to laboratory tests, have been 
an important strategy of the Laboratories in order to prevent or even reduce risk factors. 
In addition, other International Standards have been developed and applied. 
The CEN Workshop Agreement - Laboratory Biorisk Management CWA 15793:2011 
(European Committee for Standardization, 2011) and the most recent ISO 35001:2019 
that supersedes the CWA were developed by the global community (for the 
development of CWA 15793 76 participants from 24 countries have participated) to 
better minimize biorisk in the laboratory and streamline biorisk management strategies, 
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by controlling threats related to the process, storage,  transfer and removal of biological 
agents and toxins in laboratories. 
Both utilize a management system approach, a structure that incorporates best 
practices and standards and helps ensure that the organization can successfully meet all 
of its goals. They raise awareness of Biosafety and Biosecurity risks and strengthens 
global laboratory cooperation and health harmonization, which may lay the foundation 
for new or updated laws, or regulations, and may eventually release laboratory 
certification or accreditation and audits - inspections. The requirements of both CWA 
15793:2011 and ISO 35001:2019 are originally meant to be congruent with any 
established local or national guidelines, as well as with the criteria of other commonly 
used management system standards, such as ISO 9001:2008, ISO 14001:2004 and BS 
OHSAS 18001:2007. It is significant for organizations and other users to recognize that 
these are not only technical requirements. Instead, are performance-oriented reporting 
systems outlining what needs to be achieved and every laboratory must determine how 
to fulfill these goals. 
Why is it important to have a LBM system? 
Risk management systems are prevalent across many industries, especially those in 
which incidents can have major repercussions. The underlying causes of the high-
consequence incidents that are mentioned bibliographically went well beyond 
technological or human failure and almost always represented underlying deficiencies 
in security or safety management. High consequence organizations that have 
established constructive risk management programmes have accomplished a 
substantial reduction in the number and intensity of incidents (Salerno and Gaudioso, 
2015). 
Having an established Biorisk Management system in a Biomedical laboratory is very 
important, because it improves the laboratory processes and manages the risks more 
efficiently : 
➢ There is a continuous cycle of review and improvement for the laboratory’s 
effectiveness and efficiency, by identifying, understanding and managing the 
interrelated processes, in which Biosafety plays a big role. That could have as a 
result: 
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• strengthening the laboratory's procedures to achieve its Biosafety and 
Biosecurity objectives 
• there is an ongoing analysis and improvement cycle 
• there is a successful detection, assessment, monitoring and evaluation of 
laboratory Biosafety and Biosafety risks, associated with the laboratory 
activities are carried out 
➢ There is a clear guidance established, by describing the roles and responsibilities 
for those who work with or have access to biological materials in the laboratory 
➢ The number and the severity of the incidents and the Laboratory infections would 
be reduced 
➢ The appropriate training to laboratory professionals, supervisors and other 
personnel of laboratory facilities will have as a result the awareness of the 
contributing factors to risk, so that they could be mitigated adequately 
➢ The culture of awareness, a shared sense of responsibility and ethics is promoted 
➢ The response and knowledge during an emergency are enhanced (Bathula and 
Rakhimol, 2017). 
The following 2 factors are the most important to create and implement a successful 
Biosafety management system:  
1. “The Commitment by top management”, in order to provide adequate resources, 
to prioritize and communicate Biosafety and Biosecurity policy and to integrate 
the Biosafety management throughout the laboratory 
2. The “Focus on continual improvement” by making the continuous improvement a 
goal for every individual and prosses in the laboratory, identify areas and establish 
measures and goals for improvement, providing laboratory staff with the 
appropriate education and training, promote prevention activities and recognize 
improvement (European Committee for Standardization, 2011). 
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CHAPTER 4: Biorisk management in Greek Biomedical laboratories, a small 
survey 
Goals of the survey  
The first goal of this thesis is to describe the importance of a Laboratory Biorisk 
Management system. This was described in the first three chapters. The second goal is 
to review different Biomedical laboratories in Greece, to investigate how they examine 
the biological materials and get a general view on how Biosafety is handled in these 
laboratories. Using the results of this review, actions can be formulated to improve 
Biosafety in the Greek laboratories, with the ultimate goal to create a Biosafety 
management system and also a Biosafety culture for the Biomedical laboratories and 
laboratory professionals in Greece.  
Method 
To achieve the second goal information was needed. To gather this information on the 
status of Biosafety and biorisk management in Greek Biomedical laboratories, 
questionnaires (see APPENDIX I) were sent to 25 organizations that have Biomedical 
laboratories. To avoid any ethical issues that might arise, the first page of the 
questionnaire stated the purpose of the questionnaire, maintaining the confidentiality 
of the participants' personal data and information, but also the possibility of 
withdrawing the questionnaire in a later stage. 
The questions asked can be divided into 3 categories: 
1. Some general questions to get information on the laboratory 
2. Questions regarding the last 2 steps of the hierarchy of controls, ie. Administrative 
procedures and Personal Protective Equipment 
3. Questions regarding good microbiological techniques and practices used 
Results, Discussion and Conclusions 
General information: 
From the 25 send out questionnaires 15 were send back completed. This is 60%. Most 
of the questionnaires were completed by technologists (11 of 15). The laboratories that 
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completed the questionnaires cover the entire spectrum of scientific areas of Biomedical 
laboratories (see Figure 10), whether the laboratories are accredited (Figure 11), which 
biological materials are handled in these laboratories (see Figure 12) and how the tests 
are performed on these materials (see Figure 13).  
 
Figure 10: In which scientific area is the laboratory 
 
 
Figure 11: Laboratory is certified or accredited by ISO 9001 or ISO 15189 
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Figure 12: Biological materials handled in the laboratory 
 
 
Figure 13: Methods that are used for the examinations 
 
Only 20% of the laboratories have a containment level. These laboratories are all 
microbiological laboratories handling class 3 pathogens. The main Biomedical 
laboratories in these institutes are not classified as a Biosafety laboratory (Figure 14). 
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 Figure 14: Labelling of laboratories according to the Biosafety levels (BSL 1, 2, 3, 4) 
Biosafety approach in the Biomedical labs 
Regarding the steps of the hierarchy of controls, the questionnaire was focused on the 
last 2 steps, Administrative measures and Personal protection equipment. As already 
mentioned, elimination or substitution is not an option in controlling biological risks in 
Biomedical laboratories. In the 3rd step, engineering controls have not been taking into 
account. The reason for this was that modifying laboratories to increase Biosafety would 
need a budget. Budget is not something that can be easily obtained, especially with the 
limited fanatical resources in Greece. 
 
Administrative controls 
From the results it is clear that only part of the laboratories has a complete set of 
standard operating procedures for biological materials. Only 4 out of the 15 responders 
operate fully on SOPs and 7 have partially SOPs for the laboratories (Figure 15). 
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Figure 15: Examinations are performed based on standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
 
From the point of Biosafety, a couple of questions asked, if procedures from good 
microbiological techniques and procedures were in force in the laboratories. None of 
the 6 procedures were in force in all the laboratories. The disinfection of workbenches 
scored the highest with 80%. It was striking that personal hygiene and procedures that 
prevent contamination during food intake scored low. This is a great risk for the staff to 
get contaminated during lunch and coffee breaks, but also the community is at risk, 
because pathogens from the biological samples can leave the laboratories via the 
laboratory staff. This is unacceptable for reasons of public health in general (Figure 16). 
Also striking is that the large majority of laboratory staff do not participate in training 
courses, indicating that training courses are not offered by the employer, or are not 
obligatory for laboratory staff. This lack of training (Figure 17) can be the reason why 
good microbiological techniques are not enforced or even unknown. The lack of training 
can also be due to the fact that most laboratories have not a Biosafety officer and thus 
no clear responsible person for Biosafety. 
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Figure 16: Health and safety procedures are kept in your laboratory 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Participating in theoretical or practical training programmes in Biosafety 
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Figure 18: Responsible for the use of PPE by the professionals in the laboratory 
Personal protection 
From the questionnaires it is clear that the laboratory staff have access to PPE. 
However, in the most laboratories the staff themselves are responsible for this, although 
the staff protection law states that the management should be responsible (Figure 18). 
Also, here the lack of a Biosafety officer can be due to the fact that this is not properly 
regulated within the laboratories (Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: Biosafety officer appointed 
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Despite the results, most of the laboratory professionals state that they are satisfied 
with the protection measures. Only a small portion is not satisfied with the protection 
measures in the laboratory (Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20: Satisfaction with the protection measures regarding safety and Biosafety 
It may be clear from the above presented results that the level of Biosafety in many of 
the Biomedical laboratories in Greece is not at an appropriate level to prevent LAIs, but 
also infection of the general public. In general terms it can be concluded that Biomedical 
laboratories do not comply with the widely accepted BSL-2 standards, such as WHO, 
ECDC and CDC. Especially the lack of working to protocols and the implementation of 
BSL-2 principles is problematic for Greek Biomedical laboratories. Not only for Biosafety 
reasons, but also for QA reasons, and this is important because SOPs contribute both in 
Biosafety and Quality. 
Because most of the laboratory staff is satisfied with the protection measures in the 
laboratory, the question is if the laboratory professionals are aware of the potential risk 
not applying general safety and good microbiological techniques and procedures. 
Especially can be a risk for the laboratory professionals themselves, but also for the 
general public and the community. 
From the results it is clear that none of the laboratories has a proper biorisk 
management system in place and that there is also no Biosafety culture within the 
organizations. The management seems not aware of their responsibilities in given 
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regular training, performing risk assessments, working according to protocols and the 
use of PPE. Appointing a person with a special interest in Biosafety, such as a Biosafety 
officer could help the management to set-up and maintain a proper LBM with the 
mandatory PDCA cycle or the AMP-model. 
Recommendations and proposals 
What is already in Greek law and legislation 
The main Greek Law is the Presidential Decree 186/95 (Government Gazette 97/A/ 30-
5-95, as also amended by the P.D 174/97 and P.D 15/99) on “the protection of staff from 
risks related to exposure to biological agents at work.” This law is contacted for the legal 
enforcement of the European Council Directives 90/679/EEC and 93/88/EEC in Greece, 
which are also very similar and the origin of the EU Directive 2000/54.  
Based on the results of 15 Biomedical laboratories there are issues in the 
implementation of the national Greek legislation: 
➢ Risk assessments are not performed, although it is referred in the Presidential 
Decree 186/95, in “Article 3 - Determination and assessment of risks: In the case 
of any activity likely to involve a risk of exposure to biological agents, the nature, 
degree and duration of staff' exposure must be determined with a regularly 
renewed risk assessment”. 
➢ General precautions and standard Hygiene measures are partially implemented 
although it is referred to in the Presidential Decree 186/95, in Article 8, “Hygiene 
and individual protection: staff do not eat or drink in working areas where there is 
a risk of contamination by biological agents.” 
➢ Continuous training of laboratory staff by the employer is not carried out although 
it is referred in the Presidential Decree 186/95, in Article 9 – “Information and 
training of staff: 
Appropriate measures shall be taken by the employer to ensure that staff and/or 
any staff' representatives in the undertaking or establishment receive sufficient 
and appropriate training, on the basis of all available information, in particular in 
the form of information and instructions, concerning: 
( a) potential risks to health; ( b) precautions to be taken to prevent exposure; 
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( c) hygiene requirements; ( d) wearing and use of protective equipment and clothing; 
steps to be taken by staff in the case of incidents and to prevent incidents. 
The training shall be: 
o given at the beginning of work involving contact with biological agents, 
o adapted to take account of new or changed risks, and 
o repeated periodically if necessary.” 
➢ Access control in the Biomedical laboratories is not performed although it is 
referred in the Presidential Decree 186/95, in Article 6 Reduction of risks: “use of 
the biohazard sign depicted in Annex II and other relevant warning signs; drawing 
up plans to deal with accidents involving biological agents” 
From a regulatory standpoint, the conclusion here is that in Greece there is no 
enforcement of the national Greek legislation. Not only by the competent authorities, 
but also not by the management of the organizations in the hospitals and in the health 
centers of the Primary health care sector. 
There is hardly any control from the competent authorities on the various EU-
regulations that are applicable for Biomedical laboratories and that would ensure 
adequate control of the biological risks, such as the EU directive 2000/54 and other 
legislation or directives, on safety and health at work, like that could be found in the 
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work. 
Also, it reveals the lack of protocols, moreover for preventing aerosol formation, and 
it is very important the development of an efficient biorisk management framework, 
rigorous laboratory practices, continuous training and growth of the laboratory staff, in 
compliance with the European and international regulations and standards.  
Changes needed on the national/regional level: 
1. Update of the main Greek Laws P.D 186/95, P.D 174/97 and P.D 15/99, in order to 
align with the European EU directive 2000/54, as well as with the resent 
international regulations and standards 
2. Creation of a National  Authority  for the elaboration of processes, procedures and 
regulations of Biosafety and Biosecurity aspects for all Laboratories (Biomedical 
and research laboratories, but also for Animal health laboratories) for the proper 
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assessment and mitigation of the risks from any biological origin, in order to 
ensure compliance with the regulations 
o The Authority could propose a National Biorisk Management strategy and 
oversite for the Biomedical Laboratories, irrespective of the ownership type, 
field of activity, types of microorganisms and toxins with which they operate, 
and also improvements of the engineering controls (see APPENDIX II) 
3. Elaboration of training programmes for the implementation of National and 
International regulations, guidelines and requirements, in the field of Biosafety 
and biological risk management 
o Introductory and continuous training of all health professionals (Medical 
Laboratory Doctors, Biotechnologists, Nurses and other personnel) 
o Biosafety as a subject should be part of the academic training of the above 
professionals 
 Improvements that can already start on every institutional level: 
Despite appropriate legislation and enforcement of it, also institutions themselves can 
already start with improving Biosafety and start working on a LBM and the Biosafety 
culture. In this context and also considering the results of 15 Biomedical laboratories a 
current biological risk management program, associated with laboratory operations 
according to the BSL-2 procedures must be enforced, and the following 
recommendations are the first steps for an acceptable level: 
1. Create awareness of the management of the biological risk that laboratory 
professionals  are exposed to and make them aware of their responsibilities, and 
of the laboratory professionals on biological risks during their work 
2. Introduce the hierarchy of controls in Biomedical laboratories 
3. Develop SOPs and protocols for all laboratory tests and instrument operating 
procedures, entering and exiting the laboratory, PPE donning/doffing, emergency 
response (spills, incidents and accidents with biological materials), hand washing 
and waste management (see APPENDIX III) 
4. Train the laboratory professionals in Biosafety techniques, ie. good microbiological 
techniques 
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5. Prepare the Biomedical laboratories for the new standard ISO 35001:2019 
(International Organization for Standardization, 2019). In the meanwhile, the 4th 
edition of WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual could be used, when it will be 
published 
6. In every Biomedical laboratory a risk assessment should be contacted, with the 
aim to unveil what could harm the professionals, to determine whether the 
necessary precautions are in place, or if further actions should be taken, in order  
to avoid damage 
7. Designate an Appointed Biosafety Officer, responsible for Biosafety in the 
laboratories with a mandate for this purpose from the management 
o The person designated with that function could be biotechnologist-medical 
laboratory technologist, biologist, microbiologist or a relevant laboratory 
professional, with the aim to Ensure and Inspect whether Biosafety 
programmes are complied, to inform the staff for specific hazards and oblige 
the laboratory with standard operating procedures and practices 
o In every hospital one professional should be appointed as a full time 
o In every health region one professional should be appointed, responsible for 
the coordination of the health centers in the primary health sector 
8. Ensure that general precautions and standard Hygiene measures are taken and 
overseen, in order to reduce the risk of infection acquired within the laboratory. This 
includes also the washing and disinfection of the hands 
9. Ensure continuous training of laboratory professionals for maintaining the level of 
safety of the Laboratory, the responsible work with the biological materials and their 
effective protection. This training should be organized by the management or should 
be in the mandate of the Biosafety Officer. Training is very important because “It can 
be argued, therefore, that the best designed and most well engineered laboratory is 
only as good as its least competent staff” (World Health Organization, 2019) 
10. Create levels of access control in all Biomedical laboratories and designate of 
authorized personnel. There should be a Policy for patients, visitors and non-
laboratory staff entering in the lab, entry and departure procedure after completion 
of work and accident plans. 
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11. Ensure that all of the above is part of the Biorisk Management. The Biosafety Officer 
(no. 7) should be responsible for the Biorisk Management System and the connected 
PDCA cycle or AMP-model. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Biorisk Management System is based on a continuous improvement philosophy 
through a cycle of planning, implementing, reviewing and improving the operations and 
activities that a Biomedical laboratory undertakes in order to meet its objectives. It could 
enable the Biomedical laboratories to productively identify, assess, control, monitor and 
evaluate the Biosafety and Biosecurity risks associated with hazardous biological 
materials, and additionally could assist to fulfill their legal and quality requirements. 
The ultimate benefit and the primary thing to aim from the Biorisk Management is to 
eliminate or minimize to an acceptable level the risks and the possible Laboratory 
infections, in order to protect the laboratory professionals, the patients, the community, 
as well as the environment, from biological agents and toxins that are handled, 
transferred or stored at the laboratory facilities, by focusing on each individual 
laboratory professional and inspiring them with a motivation to create a safety culture, 
thus: 
“Biosafety culture is the set of values, beliefs and patterns of behavior instilled and 
facilitated in an open and trusting environment by individuals throughout the 
organization who work together to support or enhance best practices for laboratory 
Biosafety. This culture is crucial for the success of a Biosafety programme and is built 
from mutual trust and the active engagement of all personnel across the organization, 
with a clear commitment from the organization’s management. Establishing and 
maintaining a Biosafety culture provides a foundation upon which a successful Biosafety 
programme can be developed .” (World Health Organization, 2019) 
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